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An approach to bank insolvency in transition and
emerging economies




In the light of the inequity of the way losses from bank insolvencies and their
avoidance through intervention by the authorities have been distributed over
creditors, depositors, owners and the population at large in transition and
emerging economies, this paper explores a number of regulatory reforms that
would alter the balance between seeking to avoid insolvency and lowering the
costs of insolvency should it occur. In particular it considers whether a lex
specialis for dealing with banks that are in trouble through prompt corrective
action and if necessary resolving them if their net worth falls to zero, at little or no
cost to the taxpayer can be applied in the institutional framework of transition and
emerging economies.
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Pankkien konkurssit kehittyvissä ja
siirtymätalouksissa




Pankkien vararikosta aiheutuvat taloudelliset menetykset sekä viranomais-
kustannukset vararikon välttämiseksi jakaantuvat epäoikeudenmukaisesti luoton-
antajien, tallettajien, omistajien ja yleisemmin veronmaksajien kesken siirtymä-
talouksissa ja kehittyvissä kansantalouksissa. Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan
joitakin sääntelyä koskevia uudistusehdotuksia, jotka muuttaisivat vararikon
välttämiseen tarkoitettujen toimenpiteiden ja mahdollisesti toteutuvasta vara-
rikosta aiheutuvien kustannusten välistä tasapainoa. Erityisesti pohditaan voitai-
siinko kehittyvien ja siirtymätalouksien institutionaalisessa rakenteessa soveltaa
erityislainsäädäntöä. Tämän lainsäädännön myötä pankkien ongelmiin tartuttaisiin
viivyttelemättä, ja mikäli pankin varat ovat huvenneet, sen toiminta lopetettaisiin
tarpeen vaatiessa kokonaan ilman, että siitä koituisi veronmaksajille ylimääräisiä
kustannuksia.
Avainsanat: vararikko, pankit, siirtymätaloudet, kehittyvät kansantaloudet
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1 Introduction
The last two decades have seen an unwelcome rash of banking difficulties round
the world. The difficulties have resulted in substantial losses not just to those
directly involved in the banking system as owners, creditors and depositors but to
society at large as taxpayers, consumers and savers. At over $1trillion, the fiscal
cost alone over the last ten years exceeds cumulative value of foreign aid
(Passamonti, 2003). In response there has been substantial analysis of the causes
of such difficulties and a multitude of advice about how to avoid such difficulties
in the future and how to handle such difficulties as do occur.
1 There has also been
very considerable institutional and regulatory change, with the setting up of
stronger independent supervisory authorities, a focus on ‘financial stability
reviews’ and the improvement of information on both the economy and on the
banks themselves. The ‘Basel’ network has been highly active both with the
original Capital Accord and the new, Basel2, proposals (Basel Committee, 2003)
and the Financial Stability Forum. We can go on. However, remarkably little has
been done to assess the distribution of costs and the degree to which various
resolution techniques might affect both the cost and its distribution.
In Mayes et al (2001) (MHL) and Mayes and Liuksila (2003) we suggested a
scheme for handling bank exit in a manner that would minimise the costs to
taxpayers and would generally seek to place the costs of banking difficulties on
those who had voluntarily taken the risk or were responsible for the losses. These
proposals were made very much in the context of the European Economic Area
(EEA)/EU, where there has been a reluctance to let any but small banks fail and a
consequent redistribution of the losses.
2 The position in transition and emerging
markets is different. In the Asian crisis, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand all
took a considerable number of banks into public ownership
3 but they also allowed
the liquidation of a significant number of other banks (Hoggath et al, 2002). It is
the purpose of the present paper to explore the nature of those differences and the
extent to which the proposals can be applied in transition and emerging
economies.
                                                
1 The list is long but Asser (2002), Basel Committee (2002), Campbell and Cartwright (2002),
Giovanoli and Heinrich (1999), Group of Thirty (1998), Gup (1998), Hoggarth et al (2002),
Hüpkes (2000), Lastra and Schiffman (1999), Ramsey and Head (2000), and Stern and Feldman
(2003) give some idea of the flavour of what is available on the handling of difficulties.
2 These proposals are part of a much larger package of supervisory reform (chapter 4–7 of MHL)
where the emphasis is on increasing the role of ‘the market’ and market discipline in particular –
see Mayes (2000) for an exposition. Appendix 2 includes a version of the discussion of the role of
market discipline from Mayes and Liuksila (2003).
3 In the South Korean case the state ended up owning over half the banking system.8
This paper considers four principal questions:
(i) What conditions make it more likely that banks will become economically
insolvent and difficult to reorganise in transition and emerging economies
compared to more advanced countries?
(ii) Given that there are large losses that need to be resolved, why is it difficult for
transition and emerging economies to take appropriate actions? What actions
might they take to make things better?
(iii)In the light of the above, what can be done to limit the chances that banks
become economically insolvent?
(iv) If all else fails who should pay?
The structure of the rest of the paper is therefore the following: Section 2 sets out
the context. It begins by explaining why the problem of insolvency is different for
banks than for other companies and hence why it is difficult to apply general
insolvency law to banks. It then goes on to consider in the light of this why the
authorities frequently look for exceptions to insolvency in practice. The cases of
large banks or many banks facing problems at the same time are highlighted. The
section ends by investigating the moral hazard involved in having such
exceptions. Section 3 then proposes a legal framework for a less costly and more
equitable approach to handling banks facing insolvency. This takes the form of a
lex specialis for banks which enables all sizes of banks to be resolved rapidly and
without interruption to their business in the event of insolvency without the need
for public money except in the form of a guarantee for the new institution. Section
4 is the heart of the paper. It assesses the problems of implementing these
proposals satisfactorily in the transition and emerging economies. Section 5
concludes.
2 Problems facing robust exit policies in transition
and emerging economies
While avoiding bank failures may have been the norm in much of the EEA in
recent years, such failures have been much more widespread elsewhere, including
in the United States. Outside the OECD countries failures have often occurred not
so much because the government chose not to bail out the troubled banks but
because they did not have the resources to do so. This potential conflict of
objectives complicates an already complex problem generated by uncertainty. The
probability of a bank bailout will be heavily contingent, not just on the particular
bank, its importance to the financial system, the political leverage of its owners
and the cause of the problem but on the financial position of the government and9
the extent of any competing claims at the time. This uncertainty will have an
impact on the traditional moral hazard that stems from the possibility of a bank
being bailed out should it get into difficulty.
While transition and emerging economies have much in common there is also
much that differentiates them in the structure and quality of the banking system
and its regulation. There is a spectrum, some of which clearly overlaps the
position of OECD countries to whom the scheme outlined in Section 3 could
readily be applied. The ensuing discussion is thus very much one of extent rather
than a black and white classification of all transition and emerging economies.
2.1 Banks pose problems for the application of general
insolvency law
The business of banking involves taking calculated risks in taking deposits from
one group in society and lending to others, particularly when deposits can be
withdrawn rapidly and loans have a longer time to maturity. Banks price the
expected risks in the cost of their lending, along with a margin for profit, and hold
a cushion of capital against the unexpected. Since bank failures can have
expensive knock-on effects, the authorities tend also to insist on a minimum
capital cushion and on safeguards to try to ensure that risks are well managed.
These safeguards include constraints on who may own and run banks, corporate
governance structures, risk management systems, risk concentration and
requirements for disclosure of information. Even if banks are well managed the
taking of risks means they will occasionally be unlucky or subject to a special
event such a major fraud. Hence failures will always be possible.
The incidence of bank failures or circumstances that would lead to failure
without intervention will be substantial in transition and emerging economies for
a number of reasons. Banks will tend to be small and hence find it relatively
difficult to diversify risks. In some of the transition countries, the authorities were
positively keen to see quite a large number of new banks appear, to provide a
market and an alternative to the monolithic state banks (Enoch et al, 2002).
Managements and supervisors may also tend to have limited experience. This will
be particularly true in a rapidly changing environment, where new firms, products
and markets are emerging all the time. Information about borrowers is likely to be
inaccurate and accounting and auditing standards generally may make it difficult
to assess the quality of the banks themselves. Secondly economic structures in
such economies may lead to volatility and to correlated risks if the economies are
not particularly diversified.
Furthermore, the transition and emerging economies may also be
distinguished by the extent of the loss in the event of failure compared to total10
assets of the banking system, deposit insurance funds, government borrowing
ability and GDP. If losses are small relative to the resources available then
reallocations to enable greater equity may be readily possible. As they become
larger, so it becomes more difficult to offset the impact of their initial distribution.
Most of the largest proportionate losses considered in the Hoggarth et al (2002)
survey lie in emerging economies.
Bank failures are different from the failure of other companies in at least five
important respects that lead to governments wanting to intervene:
– the extent to which ordinary individuals are affected in their normal lives
– the ability to take informed decisions
– the consequences of the time it takes to complete an insolvency
– the knock-on effects in the economy
– the nature of insolvency and the ability to run down assets.
The effect on ordinary people. In the event of failure of other companies
customers are only exposed to the extent of their current transactions and even
then, where substantial sums are advanced before delivery, as in the travel
industry, it is customary to insure such advances or keep them legally separate
from the assets of the firm so they cannot be attached in the event of failure. In
banking, depositors are exposed to the full extent of their deposits, which could
represent people’s life savings. Even if losses are only partial, having one’s assets
tied up for the long periods typical in insolvency could have a major impact on the
well-being of those involved, particularly if they have few other resources to draw
on. The authorities have therefore tended to respond by insuring deposits, at least
up to some limit that covers the sorts of balances that ordinary private individuals
hold. However, most insurance funds are structured on the basis of relatively
small financial ‘accidents’ and larger events bring the cost straight through to the
public budget.
4 The FDIC, for example, is based on 1.25 percent of insured
deposits for normal risks. In Brazil the funding element is 5 percent (Beck,
2003).
5
The less financially developed the economy the less ordinary people and
particularly the less informed and poorer groups in society will be exposed.
However, financial development is likely to be an aim of governments in the hope
this can improve the rate of development of the economy as a whole, so offering
                                                
4 Unless the fund is held in the private sector, then in effect the whole balance will form part of the
public sector’s net debt and changes in it will affect the year to year public sector deficits.
5 To get an idea of how readily such funds can reach their limits, the savings and loan debacle in
the US, which was not big enough to register any decline in GDP, nevertheless exceeded the
resources of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and had to be replenished from
public funds.11
security to people in their early dealings with banks will be particularly important.
This will be of particular relevance for transition economies where previously the
vehicles for deposits will have been part of the state apparatus and hence
automatically viewed as being underwritten. A switch to the commercial
remuneration of deposits can act as an incentive for people to switch to much
more risky institutions without realising it.
The lack of information. The reasoning for protecting depositors in this way
thus also includes the fact that it is unreasonable to expect the ordinary person to
be informed about the risks that individual banks are running. However, banks are
relatively opaque by the nature of their business, even to the authorities. Most
people cannot be expected to appraise the risks they are taking on.
6 There are
further consequences of this lack of information. First, in the event of difficulty,
the more informed larger depositors and creditors will be able to get their money
out first.
7 Second, depositors in other banks, whether or not sound, may feel their
deposits are at risk and start to withdraw them, thereby contributing to an
expensive contraction of the financial system, as banks seek to realise assets in a
slack market at discounted prices.
8 Informational asymmetries are likely to be
larger in the transition and emerging markets. The less effective is market
discipline, both in normal and problem times then the more misaligned prices are
likely to be and the greater the chance of problems becoming larger before they
are recognised and the more difficult it is to piece together a solution that does not
involve financial intervention by the authorities.
The element of time. Insolvency is a time consuming process. It can take a
long time for cases to pass through the judicial system. It can take even longer, in
the case of banks, to work through the process of determining and valuing all the
various claims and realising the loans to maximise the return to the creditors.
Indeed, in some emerging economies the process may be impractical (De Luna-
Martinez, 2000). It may make more sense to forbear on impaired loans because
borrowers may be able to recover and service a loan sufficiently well that it can
then be sold to another bank. In the short run, particularly in small economies, it
may be very difficult for the private sector to find the resources to buy the
impaired assets, even at deeply discounted prices. This increases the probability in
                                                
6 The banks themselves face the problem of limited information. Repayment of loans depends on
future circumstances, such as the returns on projects and household incomes, whose current
predictability will be difficult.
7 Such asymmetric information applies in OECD countries; in the case of BCCI the major
counterparties had already largely eliminated their exposures before the bank was closed but
smaller depositors had not reacted (Herring, 2003).
8 Although bank runs tend to be more talked about than observed in OECD countries (Kaufman,
1996) there have been panics in emerging and transition economies in recent years, Albania,
Argentina and Indonesia for example.12
emerging markets that the state will be involved.
9 The alternative of selling to
foreign interests, even if politically acceptable in concept, might effectively
involve a substantial net transfer of resources.
10 Even if it is possible to make an
interim payment, creditors’ and depositors’ assets will be tied up in the resolution
process for substantial periods of time. This may then have knock on effects to
their suppliers and creditors in a contractionary spiral. It is worth noting that this
deflationary spiral occurs on both sides of the balance sheet. Liquidators may take
a harsher view of extending loans and cause a contraction in the enterprise sector
of the economy, increasing the number of bankruptcies and defaults along the way
(King, 1994). The authorities thus also have to consider the impact on debtors,
who are not a party to insolvency proceedings, yet are affected by them, as part of
assessing the general equity of the outcome.
Knock-on effects In addition to the direct knock-on effects we have just noted
to creditors and borrowers alike, there are knock-on effects within the financial
system as banks have substantial exposures to each other, particularly in short-
term and unsecured instruments. While netting and other closure rules may
mitigate this (at the expense of other creditors and depositors) this runs the risk of
exporting the problem to otherwise healthy banks. The evidence for the size of
such contagion is mixed even in the advanced countries (de Bandt and Hartmann,
2000) but this may be an area where markets are less developed in transition and
emerging economies, particularly in areas such as derivatives which pose special
problems in the US (Herring, 2003). Even more contentious is the suggestion that
depositors themselves lose confidence in the system as a whole and seek to
withdraw their deposits from healthy banks, thereby tipping them too into
difficulty through premature sale of assets (Lastra and Schiffman, 1999).
However, in this case the central bank should step in as Lender of Last Resort as
this is problem of illiquidity not insolvency.
The special nature of bank insolvency and the ability to run down assets. In
the case of an ordinary company, insolvency normally occurs when it is unable to
pay its bills and not because its balance sheet shows liabilities greater than its
assets. It is usually triggered by a cash flow problem. Most of a nonfinancial
company’s assets will be already used as collateral for loans and hence there is
little opportunity for it to alter the balance sheet in a major manner.
11 A
nonfinancial company insolvency will therefore tend to result in a substantial loss
to unsecured creditors given default. A bank on the other hand normally trades
with its assets clearly exceeding its liabilities, not least because the authorities
                                                
9 This trend towards forbearance has been clearly observed in the US (Kane, 1992, for example).
10 Since overseas purchasers of the business are buying both sides of the balance sheet there may
be no capital inflow.
11 Although some companies have effectively been able to raid the pension fund in the short run
(Draghi et al, 2003).13
require it to have a substantial capital cushion. Much of its assets would be of
value to competitors. If it gets into difficulties it can run down its assets a long
way to pay off the liabilities that are called, before it reaches a cash flow
constraint. In this process it can pass through the point where its liabilities exceed
its assets yet still have a long-list of unencumbered assets that it can continue to
liquefy, albeit at a discount. It can thus continue trading at the expense of
continuing to deepen the insolvency. If a bank can be caught early, the extent of
the insolvency may be quite small and the loss given default relatively minor to all
but the most junior creditors. This impels the authorities to put in place
requirements for Prompt Corrective Action,
12 so that banks do not have the
opportunity to worsen their position substantially. These requirements usually
inhibit the owners from expropriating the creditors and push them to coming to
agreements that will recapitalise the bank.
Unfortunately the evidence, even in the countries with the strongest PCA
requirements such as the US, is that the authorities tend to delay and allow the
problem to mount (Kane, 1989; Benston and Kaufman, 1989). In emerging and
transition economies this problem is likely to be considerably greater even if there
are no problems from the authorities being open to pressure to forbear from the
government and other vested interests. It may be more difficult to determine the
extent of the problem, to find potential buyers and impose sanctions on those
involved, for example. The ownership form of the bank is particularly important
in this regard. If a bank is not a quoted company and does not have any marketed
subordinated debt it may be very difficult to get any effective market signals
about its condition. There will be few other forces encouraging the management
and owners to restrict their risk-taking and the exposure of the creditors. If the
deposit insurance fund does not have enough resources to cover the potential loss
then it too may seek to put off declaring insolvency (Eisenbeis and Wall, 2002).
2.2 The pressure to make exceptions: ‘Too big to fail’, too
many to fail and the assessment of losses
The sheer size of the financial crises in recent years has impelled governments to
act. If many banks are in difficulty at the same time and the financial and
economic system are under threat a government cannot sit idly by, even in
circumstances where there is little it can do, as that would be political suicide.
One of the dangers of this experience is that it leads people to think that this is a
normal reaction to banking problems, and Section 2.3 considers the moral hazard
                                                
12 Structured Early Intervention and Resolution (SEIR), in the terminology of Benston and
Kaufman (1988), Benston et al (1989) and Shadow Regulatory Committee (1992).14
this involves. Traditionally, the approach has been that in normal circumstances
individual banks facing failure would not be saved, even if there were substantial
compensation for depositors and creditors. The choice over what to do depends
upon the extent of the loss and the quality of the bank’s remaining business. At
‘best’ there would be an assisted merger in the private sector, probably with a
division of the bank into a saleable part and into non-viable ‘bad’ bank, or the
creation of a ‘bridge bank’, run by the authorities in some temporary form of
nationalisation. Hoggarth et al (2002) have a neat exposition of the choices
available. However, in some cases, where the authorities think that the existing
bank has a future, loans have been made in an extension of Lender of Last Resort
into what is effectively Investor of Last Resort. The collateral for such loans may
be of disputable value if the bank is insolvent in the sense of having negative net
worth. The less transparent the regime, then the easier it is to offer such support
and the more likely it is that interest groups will be able to push the government
into making such loans. Indeed many governments have not needed pushing and
have been prepared to advance loans to institutions that are of political value to
them. Even among the most advanced financial systems such support can occur
(Hadjiemmanuil, 2003). Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) show in a study of
failing banks in 24 countries that bailing out with public funds is more than twice
as frequent as permitting liquidation. However, it is important to bear in mind that
at the time the central bank may not be sure if it is lending to an insolvent bank if
it receives what appears adequate collateral (Goodhart and Huang, 1999).
Too big to fail. At some point, however, even in regimes like the United
States where the framework is relatively transparent and the scope for support
limited, the potential costs of failure of a large bank may be thought too large for
the authorities to contemplate. This is normally because of their potential spillover
into the rest of the system. Stern and Feldman (2003) contend that this argument
is readily overdone and indeed encourages banks to try to grow or play such a role
that they are ‘indispensable’ to the success of the financial system. They suggest
that it is possible to run the regime, in the US at any rate, in such a way that no
bank is ‘Too big to fail’. The proposals in Section 3 are certainly designed to
enable that to be the case.
However, it is difficult to avoid the ‘Too big to fail’ argument in economies
where the banking system is highly concentrated, as in the Nordic-Baltic region
(Sigurðsson, 2003) and in many other transition and emerging economies. The
same applies if the problem is not detected before it becomes very large, even
though it applies to only one bank. A major loss representing a noticeable
proportion of GDP may have a harsher effect on the economy as a whole if its
impact is concentrated on those immediately affected rather than if it is spread
more widely or indeed spread over time through public debt and later taxation.
In a sense the description ‘Too Big To Fail’ is a misnomer. Something more
along the lines of ‘too big to be closed and liquidated’ (Hüpkes, 2003) is meant.15
At some point a bank is so big that the consequences of its ceasing to trade are
unacceptable. Some form of resolution is required that, while it may wipe out the
existing shareholders and impose losses on unsecured creditors, nevertheless
allows the business to continue. If a solution can be found that avoids liquidation
then it is much less likely that the losses involved will be ‘too big’ for those
exposed to bear.
Too many to fail. The argument for government action is, however, most
persuasive when the banking problem runs across many institutions at the same
time – a problem of ‘Too many to fail’ rather than too big to fail. Ingves (2003)
argues that such circumstances normally have either macroeconomic or
microeconomic causes (although a combination is likely). In the macroeconomic
case the problem may be a major external shock or natural disaster. The collapse
of the former Soviet Union was a contribution in the case of the Finnish crisis at
the beginning of the 1990s. The ripples from the Asian crises in 1997 extended to
other countries, such as the Czech Republic, even though they were not directly
affected. In such general ‘no blame’ circumstances, governments try to stabilise
the macroeconomy against the consequences of the shock. It is easy to extend the
argument to generalised support for the financial system to avoid the external
shock leading to a debt-deflation spiral (King, 1994). However, such
macroeconomic problems are often also the consequence of government action
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Following unsustainable policies, say in the form
of an exchange rate peg, will result in rapid adjustments when the last straw is
added. Such a policy, in trying to track the ERM was clearly an important
contribution to Finland’s crisis, similarly failure to address fiscal management
problems in Argentina meant that confidence evaporated when the real exchange
rate appreciated. A government can thus be responsible for the crisis in the sense
of having a system that is prone to generate such drastic adjustments. There is
therefore an argument that if the shock is external, society at large should pay, not
just those exposed in the more marginal banks.
It is difficult to see where such an argument should end. It is clearly easier to
apply in small open economies, particularly those with relatively undiversified
systems. They always find it relatively difficult to attain a stable exchange rate
regime, hence solvency-threatening shocks will be more likely. However, rather
than responding through bailing out, it may be possible to increase the economy’s
resilience to shocks. A move to inflation targeting and a fully flexible exchange
rate may offer rather more protection from extreme shocks (Sepp and Randveer,
2002), for example.
13 Even where the alternative end of spectrum is used to
anchor the system, as with the currency board in Estonia, the consequence of a
                                                
13 In agricultural societies, where losses of income may be massive when a harvest fails and not
reversible until the following year, farmers, their suppliers and financing institutions all operate
with much larger cushions, hence reducing the threat of insolvency to levels tolerable elsewhere.16
shock such as the Russian crisis of 1998, can be amplified by the banking system
(Kaasik et al, 2003).
14 In such circumstances it by no means clear that the
appropriate response is through support for banks rather than macroeconomic
adjustment.
The argument is equally open to misuse in the case of the ‘microeconomic’
causes, which in Ingves’s terminology implies that it is the regulation and
supervision of the banking sector that is not being run satisfactorily. Thus if banks
are being allowed to evade capital adequacy requirements or run very risky
strategies, then in some sense it is the authorities’ fault that they get into difficulty
and the authorities’ responsibility to help get them out of it. One of the most
common examples is financial deregulation/liberalisation; Gruben et al (2002)
explore this for Mexico and Argentina.
15 With stronger market discipline lending
did not increase rapidly in Argentina, unlike Mexico (and Canada). Removing
barriers faces banks with competitive threats and market opportunities that they
have not previously dealt with. Even prudent organisations will make serious
strategic errors in these circumstances. If there are strong possibilities of first
mover advantage then banks would be foolish not to try to move rapidly into the
new business. Yet just that rush for the market is bound to create a fallout. Not
everyone can succeed, as is obvious from the development of new industries. The
internet boom of the late 1990s was a rational response to the probability of major
gains for the successful few. For banking authorities the fallout is more complex
and arguably, therefore, the way in which liberalisation is introduced has to be
preceded by changes in the supervisory framework and risk management regime
within banks (Gruben et al, 2002; de Juan, 2002).
16 Such novelty for both
supervisors/regulators and bank managements will tend to be larger for transition
and emerging markets even if they follow templates laid down by the IMF or
OECD countries. Managing regime change well is a particular challenge for
emerging and transition economies.
Inadequate assessment of the net costs of different strategies under
insolvency. A third factor that contributes to the willingness of the authorities to
act by bailing out banks is a failure to unpick the consequences of different bank
exit policies from the overall effects of the crisis. The costs of the Finnish banking
crisis of the early 1990s are variously estimated between around 7 percent of
                                                
14 Estonian banks cut back lending sharply rather than raising interest rates. This reflects a
common problem in transition and emerging markets. Because the market-clearing interest rate
would be very high, given that many existing borrowers feel locked in and obliged to borrow more
to pay the interest, quantitative restraint is the only sensible way for banks to proceed.
15 It was also a feature contributing to the Finnish crisis.
16 It has to be said that despite this being well-known by the second half of the 1980s (Hunn et al,
1989), the Nordic countries, with the exception of Denmark implemented the liberalisation process
in a manner that contributed to the subsequent crisis by having banks and supervisor who were
insufficiently prepared.17
GDP, if one takes the net injection of public funds into the banking system, and
around 50 percent of GDP, if one considers how long it took to regain the level of
GDP implied by projecting the longer run trend that prevailed before the crisis.
Indeed, if one takes unemployment as part of the cost, that cost is still continuing
and even on optimistic forecasts is not expected to reach pre-crisis levels in the
current decade (Mayes and Liuksila, 2003, ch.1; Jonung and Hagberg, 2002;
Hoggarth et al, 2002). In the face of such frightening numbers, it is not surprising
that governments feel inclined to act. In the main, however, they will be gross
over-estimates of the costs of one form of bank resolution compared to another, as
they assume that all of the costs of the crisis are due to the banking problems and
that the comparator should be a zero effect. The drawbacks of the approach can be
seen from the fact that of the 32 cases considered by Hoggarth et al (2002) five
were followed by an increase in GDP compared with previous trends – not a loss.
Even a fall in GDP may not represent a net welfare loss, as crises may easily be
therapeutic and enforce changes that would otherwise be difficult to achieve (see
Bollard and Mayes, 1993, for a discussion of the mid-1980s crisis in New
Zealand).
Thus, these numbers do not tell us the difference in impact between one
approach to banking problems compared to another. In particular they do not tell
us the difference in effect between a strong preventive regime and a regime where
there is a swift reaction in the event of a crisis. In a very helpful and
comprehensive comparison Hoggarth et al (2002) show how costs vary in a
sample of 32 crises according to the measures used.
17 Nevertheless, there is an
obvious reverse causation problem here. Larger difficulties will result in larger
payouts even if larger payouts reduce the size of a given crisis.
Even though we can estimate for a particular bank what the direct fiscal cost
of different methods of exit are likely to be before taking a decision, a much more
comprehensive model is required to estimate the feedback effects onto the rest of
the economy. Ex-post estimation of the net fiscal costs, as in the case of Ingves
and Lind (1997), does not offer a clear answer either, even if the results are
appropriately discounted to allow for the delays. Ex-ante the costs face a
probability distribution for the likely future receipts on selling assets or repayment
of loans. Once one is no longer prepared to take the current market valuation as
being correct, the whole area becomes open to debate. This is a particular worry
for economies where very little of the banks’ assets and liabilities has a market
price or any reasonable means of marking to market. Then ex-ante valuations will
                                                
17 Costs are measured by ‘fiscal’ costs (how much was paid out gross from public funds) and two
measures of output (GDP) costs (deviation in growth rates during the crisis period from the
previous 3-year trend; deviation in GDP level during crisis period from previous 10 year trend). It
is not clear how much these sums include all of the ancillary costs and contingent liabilities, such
as administrative and legal costs, which can be several percentage points of the assets of a bank.18
be highly contentious and there will be considerable scope for the authorities and
interested parties to produce optimistic valuations that coincide with their
objectives.
It is clear from the analyses of Daniel (1997) and Daniel et al (1997) that
governments have used a variety of devices over the years to disguise the extent
of the costs to the taxpayer of intervention in the banking system. A common
device is to value nonperforming loans at artificially high levels. According to De
Luna-Martinez (2000), the Mexican government purchased nonperforming loans
at book value from the banks. This bolsters the banks at the time and effectively
enables the government to write off the non-performance over a long period.
Governments are likely to be subject to much lighter accounting rules for their
assets than they themselves impose on banks. While the US system assumes that
the cost to the deposit insurer, FDIC, is as good a proxy as any for the cost to the
taxpayer, the number of routes available to the FDIC in the event are actually
quite small – bailing out not being one of them. Furthermore wider costs are not
considered, particularly any distributional consequences.
18 If the real choice
between courses of action, given the circumstances, were considered by having
even reasonably accurate assessments of their costs, then it is highly likely that the
arguments in favour of a bail out would be much weaker.
2.3 Moral hazard
The biggest problem in assessing the potential cost of different approaches to
bank exit is that expectation of the regime that will be applied, should failure
threaten, affects people’s behaviour, particularly that of bank owners and
management prior to insolvency. Thus if creditors and depositors expect a blanket
guarantee in the event of widespread banking problems they will be much more
prepared to lend to banks without regard to the risks involved, as they have less to
lose. If on the other hand bank management expects to lose its job and bank
owners see a good chance of the value of their shares wiped out, they will have
much greater regard to the prudence with which the bank is being run. ‘How
much?’ is a much more difficult question to answer.
Granlund (2003) suggests that the impact of bank exit regimes on bank
financing costs could be as much as 30–40 basis points in the major markets. The
valuation by Fitchratings of implicit governmental guarantees is of the order of
two ratings classes, again nontrivial. However, there is very little evidence that
larger banks actually run greater risks as a result of their too big to fail status.
                                                
18 Wider concerns are only possible in the US case if it is decided to invoke Too Big To Fail,
which has not been done since the 1988 FDICIA reform and could only apply to between 10 and
30 of the largest banks.19
Even if disciplining devices exist in the form of subordinated debt, Bliss and
Flannery (2000) find that bank managements may not respond. The extent of the
moral hazard involved from expected bailout is therefore difficult to judge. Stern
and Feldman (2003) regard it as being significant even in the US, which has a
regime strongly geared against bailing out.
The potential impact of moral hazard in transition and emerging economies
seems likely to be more complicated. Bank deposits tend to be a smaller ratio of
GDP and hence the ability to bail out may be greater. On the other hand the
probability of default and the loss given default may also be larger, hence
reducing the ability of the fund to pay in the event of default. In the face of a lack
of clear rules to the contrary, practical difficulties in the implementation of
insolvency proceedings, and generalised worries over the fragility of the financial
system the chance of the moral hazard being greater seem good. The idea of
‘constructive ambiguity’ works in the opposite direction to that often suggested.
While the risk averse may react to uncertainty about whether they will be bailed
by being more cautious, those more inclined to take risks and hence be those most
likely to encounter problems are more likely to take an optimistic view and hence
take more risk. The spread of prudential behaviour by banks may increase if the
authorities are ambiguous about their likely actions under potential bank failure.
Since it is the tail of the distribution, which matters for bank failures, this is likely
to increase both the number of potential failures and their size.
The discussion of moral hazard in this context normally revolves round the
existence of deposit insurance, particularly if the financing of that insurance
places little burden on banks or their customers (Beck, 2003). However, it is not at
all clear that the general run of insured smaller scale depositors pay much
attention to the riskiness of banks even where insurance does not exist. This is in
part because of the existence of implicit guarantees. Even though deposits may be
uninsured, as in New Zealand, for example, it would be very surprising if one of
the main banks were to fail and no funds were made available to small depositors
if large numbers of them seemed set to lose a lot of money. The insurance may
deter a run on the bank by the uninformed mass of depositors but it is the larger
uninsured depositors and creditors who have the main interest in monitoring and
disciplining the bank. Since the deposit guarantee fund becomes a major holder of
contingent liabilities it may exert a strong influence where there was little
beforehand.
Thus, taken together, there are factors that enhance and factors that inhibit
moral hazard in transition and emerging economies compared to their OECD
counterparts. A reason for thinking the hazard might be larger, despite failures to
bail out in the past is simply that by and large, the larger banks in the OECD
countries appear not to have exploited the hazard entailed by too big to fail. In
smaller communities bank owners can be well aware of the likely pressures on
them from their neighbours. Though few like the owner of the bank in Telluride in20
the Depression would be prepared to go to jail for obtaining loans from banks in
New York to payout their customers when default seemed inevitable.
3 The scheme
19
There is a downward slope of difficulty down which problem banks tend to slide
and which requires increasingly drastic action to be taken. Although
categorisation is arbitrary, there are four main tiers of ‘problem’ banks that have
encountered losses:
(i) Banks whose capital is inadequate from a market (or their own) point of view
but who meet regulatory standards
(ii) Banks that breach regulatory capital standards but are generally thought to be
solvent
(iii)Banks that breach regulatory capital standards and are economically but not
legally insolvent (net worth is negative)
(iv) Banks that are insolvent and can no longer continue trading without a capital
injection.
Our concern in this scheme is with tiers (iii) and (iv). Banks in tier (i) do not
require regulatory intervention but their plight will have been reflected in market
prices and eventually in their ratings. Here we would expect private sector
solutions. The bank might be able to continue by raising more capital from its
owners and making drastic improvements to the business – cutting costs, selling
profitable non-banking or banking parts of the business to improve both the
capital position and the cash flow. More likely, they will find themselves in
merger or takeover talks.
Banks in the remaining tiers require action by the authorities. Asser (2001)
labels them jointly as banks in ‘distress’, although terminology tends to differ
among authors. The Basel Committee (2002) refers to ‘weak’ banks ‘one whose
liquidity or solvency is or will be impaired unless there is a major improvement in
its financial resources, risk profile, strategic business direction, risk management
capabilities and/or quality of management.’ (p. 1) Banks in tier (iv) have reached
the point of closure or taxpayer bailout, everything else having failed (or the
shock being too large). There are some circumstances, as with Barings, where the
shock (loss) is so large that the bank goes straight into tier (iv) without any prior
warning. In those cases a market solution may still be possible because it has not
                                                
19 A summary of the MHL scheme drawn from chapter 1 of Mayes and Liuksila (2003) is included
as Appendix 1.21
previously been tried. It is well known that a bank is worth more alive than dead
(Guttentag and Herring, 1983) even though its value may be negative. In any case,
whatever the value of the bank is will be reflected in its purchase price.
Banks in tiers (ii) and (iii) can continue trading at least for a while even if
what they are effectively doing is realising their assets at steadily deeper discounts
in order to pay off depositors and uninsured creditors who are unwilling to bear
the increased risk. The crucial difference between the two is that in tier (iii) there
is no longer enough value in the bank to pay out all the creditors and depositors if
they should wish it. Such a bank is not legally insolvent, as it is still able to meet
its day to day obligations. In some environments it could continue almost
indefinitely in this state, for example, if the market believes that the bank will be
bailed out should it ever fail to meet its obligations. However, banks that are in
this tier, either where there is no guarantee or where the market’s belief in the
implicit guarantee is erroneous, are in effect trading at the expense of the
uninsured depositors and creditors and the underwriters of the insurance fund. The
window in which the junior or subordinated debtors will receive anything much in
the way of payout in the event of failure is quite small as the costs of insolvency
normally mop up quite a substantial part of the value of the company, all of which
is set off against the claims of the creditors in reverse order of seniority. We argue
that banks in tier (iii) should be treated in the same way as tier (iv), as they are
only viable through the contingent claim on the taxpayer.
20
To meet the concerns of Section 2 any efficient and equitable approach to
bank exit has to include:
– those involved in running banks and exercising control over management as
shareholders, creditors, depositors etc. have to believe it will be applied –
without exceptions
– it should cut in rapidly at an early stage in the process so that there is less
opportunity for losses to mount
– it has to be capable of being applied very quickly so that the business of the
bank can be continued on the next trading day
– it needs to offer an outcome no worse than the parties would get under
insolvency and it needs to respect priority of creditors under insolvency
– losses should fall first on the owners and managers of the bank to the extent of
their liability
– it should avoid calling on taxpayers, except in the process of ensuring the
smooth functioning of deposit insurance and ensuring public confidence in the
subsequent arrangements
                                                
20 We deal explicitly with the treatment of banks in tier (ii) in a framework of Prompt Corrective
Action (or SEIR, Structured Early Intervention and Resolution) in Llewellyn and Mayes (2003).22
– it should apply equally to all banks whatever their size and ownership and the
actions of the authorities in applying it should be public and transparent.
Such a programme cannot of course stand on its own and will need to form part of
a wider system respecting the rules of good corporate governance, bank regulation
and supervision. Deposit insurance is not fundamental to the scheme as such.
However, the structure of any insurance schemes that do exist will affect both the
credibility of the exit regime and the institutional arrangements required to deal
with the priority of the insurance fund in insolvency. Moreover any such scheme
will be in addition to other measures being implemented for reducing the chance
of banking crises and the early detection of factors that might lead to such crises.
The MHL (2001) scheme seeks to meet these concerns. It provides a credible
means for resolving any bank that is facing insolvency in a manner that avoids the
use of public money and yet appears equitable in the face of the normal balance of
interests applied in a country under insolvency. The scheme wipes out the
shareholders first and leaves the creditors and uninsured depositors to bear any
remaining loss according to the priority principle that would apply under
insolvency. It can be applied very rapidly, so there is no need for the bank as a
business to suspend trading even though ownership changes and it is applied early
in the process of distress so that the chances of developing very large losses is
reduced.
21 This means that the problems of too big to fail are likely to be avoided
in the event of idiosyncratic shocks. However, too many to fail pressures might
still emerge. The key impact of the scheme is expected to be largely deterrent.
Managers, owners and uninsured creditors would have an increased incentive to
see that the banks in which they have a stake are managed prudently and avoid
getting into difficulty. If difficulty is encountered then there is a strong incentive
to work quickly towards some private sector injection of capital, as the losses are
likely to be larger if the state has to intervene.
The scheme has three principal ingredients
– the authorities are required to take control of the bank according prescribed
benchmarks
– the new administrator of the insolvent bank values the assets and liabilities up
front and writes down the claims far enough to return the bank to operational
solvency
– the bank reopens for business under new control/ownership with no material
break in operation.
                                                
21 We assume that the reorganisation process would take place over a ‘weekend’ so that a problem
revealed on one trading day has a solution that results in trading being resumed on the next trading
day.23
It is worth filling in a little more of the detail before considering how well the
scheme might operate in transition and emerging economies. The scheme is
designed to meet the normal prerequisites for a good insolvency law. Aghion et al
(1992) and Hart (1999) for example suggest three goals for a good insolvency
law, each of which is aimed at making the process efficient.
(i) a good insolvency law should maximise the total value (in money terms)
available to be divided amongst the insolvent firm’s appropriate stakeholders;
(ii) it should adequately penalise incumbent management and shareholders so as
to preserve the bonding role of debt, and
(iii)observe the absolute priority of contracts negotiated ex ante.
The Bank for International Settlements (2002) identifies three similar goals:
efficiency (in terms of more to be shared out), equity (people getting what they
should, relative to each other) and the reduction of legal and financial
uncertainty.
22
The key starting point is that bank insolvency needs to be covered by a lex
specialis (public law) that enables the authorities to step in and take control of the
bank from the existing shareholders. A lex generalis, private law approach to
insolvency means that the process has to be handed over to the courts and that
quick resolutions are much less likely. Hadjiemmanuil (2003) (and to a lesser
extent Blowers and Young (2003)) argue in favour of the ‘London approach’,
whereby the courts manage the process under general insolvency law but
normally act closely under the advice of the competent regulator, now the
Financial Services Agency and previously the Bank of England. The UK has the
benefit of having operated this partnership for some time. It is not immediately
clear that other regimes would be able to operate this in a non-conflictual manner.
Courts would have to make it very clear that private petitions that could upset and
delay the process would not normally be entertained without very good cause,
otherwise the scheme would fall at the first hurdle and the reorganisation would
not be rapid enough to keep the business of the bank operating. To quite some
extent such systems work on trust rather than simply the letter of the law.
Transition and emerging economies are relatively unlikely to have the history that
would make such an arrangement possible. The Swiss proposals (Hüpkes, 2003)
come much closer to the balance MHL (2001) had in mind.
The second requirement is a straightforward required intervention point for
the authorities that cannot be evaded. MHL suggest it should be zero net worth or
‘economic insolvency’, so that value of the bank is zero and hence in taking over
the bank from the shareholders they are not being deprived of anything (except
                                                
22 I am grateful to Bethany Blowers and Garry Young for this formulation (ch. 5 in Mayes and
Liuksila, 2003).24
worthless claims). As we have noted, determining the net worth is a non-trivial
matter but it is necessary not just for intervention but for writing down the claims
to the point that the value becomes positive.
23 In the US the mandatory
intervention point for closure is when regulatory capital falls to two percent of
assets. It is judged that at this point a bank will clearly have negative net worth.
MHL did not follow this lead because it involves using a valuation that is
expected to be misleading and may in practice permit considerable insolvency
before the intervention point is reached. Nevertheless, having a hard fast
intervention point based on supervisory measures as in the US is better than
having inexplicit benchmarks.
The third requirement is institutional. In many countries a whole variety of
organisations plus the courts have to be involved in bank resolution. The problems
are even worse if the bank is part of a complex financial organisation that runs
across both sectors and countries. Some institution needs to have the lead and the
administrators who can be put in to implement the change have to form part of a
panel that is agreed in advance. The list of possible candidates for taking the lead
includes the central bank, the bank supervisory authority, the deposit insurance
agency and some high level corporate regulator or commerce commission. It
should not include the ministry of finance or any other organisation that might
have direct access to funds that could be used in a bailout. Clearly the rules,
priorities and forms of consultation need to be agreed in advance, particularly
where one country is going to act on behalf of all the interested parties in a single
action. The more complex and opaque the set up, the less plausible it is that it will
be able to act in a robust manner in the event of a problem and the more likely that
powerful interests can negotiate support or at least forbearance.
24
The MHL proposals are thus very similar to what exists in the US since
FDICIA but are somewhat more encompassing and have a different suggested
intervention benchmark. They also form part of a much wider supervisory
framework for banks, that includes requirements for corporate governance
structures, public disclosure, transparency in the regulatory process and
accounting/auditing standards.
25
                                                
23 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand suggested to us that the claims should be written down to the
point that the new bank met the capital adequacy requirements and that the creditors/depositors in
effect became the new owners of the bank, receiving an equity for debt swap in proportion to the
absolute write down of their claims. This is similar to the Aghion et al (1992) proposals but these
have not to our knowledge been implemented.
24 Das et al (2003) show that these elements of regulatory governance are clearly related to
financial system soundness.
25 Chapters 8–10 of Mayes et al (2001) outline the proposals for bank exit policy while chapters 4–
7 set out the wider proposals for reforming banking supervision, drawing heavily on the
arrangements that have been in place in New Zealand since 1996.25
4 The problems of implementing the scheme in
transition and emerging economies
Since our proposals represent a substantial change to existing procedures, many
reasons can be advanced as to why they might pose problems in implementation.
This section considers the most obvious that might apply in transition and
emerging economies. The introduction listed six issues that might inhibit the
implementation of the proposed scheme:
– a weak history of regulatory, supervisory and banking practice
– poor quality information available to bank management
– poor quality of information available to the market and supervisors
– limited tools available particularly market discipline
– limited skills and experience of those involved
– strong influence of interest groups and limited transparency of processes.
These impinge in a number of different ways.
4.1 The problem of history
There is a dilemma in the introduction of any more rigorous regime. On
introduction it is likely to reveal problems, as it does not start with a clean slate.
Bad lending and regulatory practices in the past may have created a substantial
‘black hole’ of largely valueless assets and a major contingent liability in the
expectation that the state will look after the future.
26 The extent of problems with
some banks may greater than their creditors and unsecured debtors realised. If
introduction of the scheme is going to result in a string of bank failures and loss of
confidence by many in the existing banking system then there will be an
understandable reluctance by the authorities to implement the scheme. The
                                                
26 However, many economies, particularly the transition countries, have already experienced major
banking crises that have entailed radical change in the system, resulting in substantial foreign
ownership of banks and closure of the black hole. Fleming et al. (1997) set this out for the Baltic
States and Enoch et al.(2002) for Bulgaria, Mongolia and Lithuania. Much of the initial problem
arose from the nature of conversion of the state banks to the new regime and the proliferation of
new banks. Having a very permissive approach to new entrants created considerable problems and
the poor functioning of the court system hindered their resolution. However, having gone through
the experience the position is now considerably improved, in terms not just of bank quality and
management but in the institutional structure of supervision and the stability of macroeconomic
policy. In the early days of transition, banking was heavily hampered by the lack of a proper
framework of property rights that could give concepts such as collateral a viable meaning.26
chances of rehabilitating the banking system may be small and the expectation
may be that come the first serious pressure there will indeed be a crisis and the
banks will close. The experience of Indonesia in 1997 provides helpful
illustration. The closure of 16 banks on 1st November 1997 was not very effective
in establishing confidence in the rest of the system, as it was not clear whether
there would be further closures (or backtracking)
27 (Boorman and Hume, 2003). A
good time to introduce a reform in legislation and indeed in the structure of the
authorities responsible is indeed shortly after a crisis (as was the case in the
Nordic countries). However, it is hardly responsible to wait for a crisis before
making changes in the public interest. The problem is to match the legislative
change with other actions to ensure confidence in the system. Some sort of
guarantee for the continuing banks is the normal way to proceed (Lindgren et al,
1999).
Furthermore it is unlikely to be the introduction of the robust exit policy per
se that contributes to a loss of confidence in the banking system. That is more
likely to come from the improvement in standards of information necessary for an
efficient supervisory system, discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Indeed, an
improved exit policy is likely to be one of the features needed when information
improves.
Similarly, limitations imposed by a lack of credibility in the existing
supervisory and regulatory institutions, as a result of their history, need to be
tackled irrelevant of exit policy. Wholesale change is often more effective than
rehabilitation, as it is difficult to demonstrate that an existing organisation has
fundamentally changed if it is still staffed by the same people doing the same job.
Such institutional change is therefore likely to be implemented before progressing
with exit policy, or at least as part of the same legislative reform. The next section
therefore turns to these practical limitations before moving on to the quality of
information and the lack of market discipline.
4.2 Barriers to action
The biggest barriers to effective action in the run up to insolvency are institutional
and legal. If clear and predictable means of resolving problem banks do not exist
then every problem becomes a political one. If the supervisors or whichever is the
relevant agency charged with ensuring compliance with the regulations and
prompt corrective action in the event of noncompliance do not have both the
freedom and duty to act, then resolution will be difficult.
                                                
27 The President’s son owned one of the banks and was effectively able to reopen it under a new
name – an example of the operation of effective political pressure under the last of six headings of
difficulties in the case of transition and emerging economies set out in the introduction.27
In transition countries, in particular, the authorities face a major problem in
handling insolvency, in that many of the significant banks will be foreign owned
and hence not primarily under their control. However, in normal circumstances,
this is likely to be a second-order problem, as this same foreign ownership is
likely to impart more stability and better management of risk, hence reducing the
chance of insolvency or serious banking difficulties. The foreign parent is likely
to have more than adequate resources to meet the losses of its subsidiaries in
smaller markets and indeed the reputational incentive to do so. However, should
insolvency threaten the foreign banking group as a whole, the host country of the
branch or subsidiary will not have much of a say in the resolution of problems,
which will be undertaken by the lead regulator, who will be in the home country.
This presents two potential problems. In the first place a bank that is
important in the host country, in the sense that their closure or problems may have
systemic implications, may not be systemic in the home country. The home
country authorities may therefore be prepared to encounter all the problems of
insolvency and allow the bank to shut. Even if they do not, the form of resolution
of the problem they choose may be very different from that the host country might
apply (Mayes and Vesala, 2000). For many emerging and transition economies
the discrepancy in size can be very large, take Estonia and its Swedish-owned
banks for example (Riksbank, 2003).
The second difficulty that emerges is that if public funding or insurance is to
be used in the home country it will not extend to the host country to the same
extent or possibly at all. The degree to which the authorities in one country will be
prepared to bail out or otherwise compensate the depositors or creditors in other
countries is likely to be decidedly limited. Indeed the natural reaction, as in
insolvency itself, would be for each country to try to find a solution that is to its
relative advantage, as was demonstrated in the BCCI failure.
Although the worst of the of the opportunities for beggar-thy-neighbour
solutions have been reduced since the BCCI affair the problem has not
disappeared, even in the EU, with the Winding–up Directive (Hadjiemmanuil,
2003; Campbell, 2003). Although the EU now has an approach to handling banks
whose operations run across borders through branches, there are still
discrepancies in the case of subsidiaries. The single entity approach to the
resolution of companies is normally thought to be the way of maximising value
for the creditors. It is then possible in the resolution of the group as a whole to
consider the selling of parts for the benefit of the group’s creditors, wherever they
happen to be.
Outside the EU/EEA the authorities have discretion over whether foreign
banks should be allowed to set up or acquire subsidiaries and can reject solutions
that would change the management of banking subsidiaries in their jurisdiction in
ways they find unacceptable. However, in rejecting a resolution, they might28
precipitate a closure of the subsidiary instead.
28 In the EU/EEA, the ‘passport’ and
the principle of home-country control make the position clearer but not
necessarily easier and may actually make resolution of bank insolvency for a
transition country entering the EU, become somewhat more difficult.
Supervisory authorities have a network of memoranda of understanding
(MoUs) such that they can share information in order to co-ordinate the
supervision of large and complex cross-border banks. While these may be slanted
to provide more information in the event of difficulty, it is clear that each
supervisor will be concerned to resolve the problem from its own point of view.
More importantly, this co-operation does not normally extend to the use of powers
for resolution or the injection of public funds. Here it is still the case that the
authorities expect to act on a case by case basis. When actions have to be taken in
a hurry then it would be difficult to include the views of second countries even
where the home country is keen to do so. When the problems result in an extended
period of ‘prompt’ corrective action then the opportunity for such discussions
exists (Brouwer et al, 2003).
The foregoing discussion presupposes that countries have the resources to
handle such cross-border banking problems if they occur. This is not the case even
for the OECD countries. One of the key issues for some of the smaller EEA
countries is that they are rather small compared to their largest banks, which are
international. The problem applies even more to Switzerland where UBS and
Credit Suisse while headquartered in Switzerland have most of their operations
elsewhere.
29 Transition and emerging market economies are not normally in that
position as a home country, but may readily be a host with a bank whose home
country cannot cover the world-wide losses.
30 However, they can readily find the
cost of a banking crisis or of demands on a deposit insurance fund can be greater
than the fund can bear. While for advanced countries the solution may be simply
to issue some more debt in the short run this option may not be open.
                                                
28 Clearly there are attractions in having locally incorporated subsidiaries that are themselves
required to hold adequate capital against risks. Then the authorities have a functioning entity that
can be compulsorily acquired and placed under new ownership in the event of insolvency.
However there must also be attractions to having branches or other arrangements where local
depositors are insured by home (foreign) country, as is the case for Deutsche Bank in New
Zealand (Deutsche Bank New Zealand Group, 2003, 2–3).
29 Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2993) show that around a third of Europe’s 30 largest banks have
at least half of their assets outside the home country and would pose major problems of saving for
their home authorities.
30 Where such countries are acting as an offshore ‘haven’ for foreign banks then they may very
well have banks that are large compared to the country’s resources but in those cases no one is
expecting a bailout. Indeed, the lack of protection for depositors and creditors normally forms part
of the objection to the existence of such havens.29
The extent of the problem is readily illustrated by Finland, which went from
having a trivial public sector debt to GDP ratio to nearly 60 percent as a result of
the crisis. Although by far the largest of the Nordic crises this crisis was still not
by any means the largest in international terms. Switches of this size may well be
impossible to sustain. Two outcomes are therefore possible. One is to allow the
deposit insurance fund to default. The other is to start monetising the debt. The
second leads to all sorts of other problems but limiting the liability of the deposit
insurance fund has a lot to recommend it. In Switzerland the liability of the fund is
limited to 4bnCHF.
31 The Finnish problem is simply that with international banks
it becomes much more difficult to follow a solution that is manageable for the
domestic economy and suitable for all the countries involved. It would be difficult
to justify a major expenditure by taxpayers in one country to support depositors in
another. In these circumstances banks would be ‘too big to save’. However, the
necessary international co-operation to address the problem seems more likely to
occur after the first serious crisis in this regard rather than before it (Brouwer et al,
2003; Riksbank, 2003).
The MHL proposals go down this road by a different route, which is to limit
the potential demands on the fund by acting early. This reduces the chance of a
large claim, except when there is an economy-wide problem. In those
circumstances, of course the better remedies themselves are macroeconomic
rather than financial. However, the other tightening up of the supervisory
arrangements should reduce the chance of banking induced financial crises. In this
respect the proposed scheme therefore offers improved prospects for transition
and emerging economies than current arrangements.
4.3 Quality of information, accounting standards and
transparency – disclosure by banks
One of the inherent problems in monitoring banks is opacity. Banks themselves
can only estimate the risks they face and second-hand observers, whether market
analysts, rating agencies or supervisory authorities, will always be at a
disadvantage. The more open banks are, the greater the chance that outsiders will
be able to detect problems and force earlier action. However, the main aim is
deterrence, if banks expect that they may be found out, then they become more
reluctant to run the risks that may cause the problem. No disclosure regime will
provide enough detail but the Basel2 proposals, by falling short in some respect of
what is already disclosed in New Zealand, for example – quarterly reports with
                                                
31 Such a limit is in addition to any that may be applied on each individual depositor or to the share
of the liable capital (30% in the case of Germany, for example).30
short delays, regularly audited, with disclosure of peak exposures, not end period
figures or period averages – are not offering a great deal of assistance to outside
monitors (or indeed to shareholders).
The key incentive in the New Zealand case is to make bank directors liable
for the disclosure statements made (rather more forcibly than the controversial
requirements in the US following the Enron collapse). By making them
responsible for the accuracy of what is disclosed directors, whether executive or
nonexecutive, have an incentive to ensure that they are convinced that the
management in the company are revealing what is actually the case and so on
down the chain of responsibility. Fining rich people and banks for infringements
is always likely to be ineffective but making bank directors liable for up to three
years in gaol simply for false disclosures sharpens the focus considerably. (Fining
banks when they are in difficulty is singularly unhelpful as it simply makes the
problem worse. It does not even work as a deterrent as it is the uninsured
depositors and creditors who pay. In countries where the deposit insurance fund
does not have priority in claims it results in one part of the public sector paying
another. If it is private sector funded then the successful banks and their
depositors pay and not those responsible in the failed bank.)
Given that many of the OECD countries have problems with the extent and
quality of disclosure it is only to be expected that transition and emerging
economies will find the problems even more difficult. However, disclosure of
information is of little value if what is being disclosed is itself rather inaccurate.
In many countries, even where accounting standards are adhered to, the
conventions relate largely to historical values and hence produce information that
is of little value for decision-making. This provides one of the biggest barriers to
assessing the extent of problems in EEA countries, for example. Information is
not produced in a form that enables the assessment of net worth. The trend is
towards more market valuation but slowly and with considerable reluctance.
Ensuring audits that are both independent and informative is a widespread
problem, as has been revealed in the US. In some jurisdictions auditors are not
obliged to show adequate independence and are not open to court action for the
accuracy of their statements. It is interesting in this regard that the Japanese
authorities have used auditing and accounting standards as a means of forcing
banks to admit their insolvency, as in the case of Resona earlier this year. Simply
disclosing the problem and the extent to which the taxpayer is going to pay is a
better route to resolving the issue than leaving the extent and incidence of the loss
uncertain. In that case, households will seek to protect themselves, by building up
saving outside the banks, helping to induce deflation.
It is easy to blame banks for the poor quality of the information they disclose
but the same difficulties will apply to the banks themselves in trying to obtain
information from actual and potential customers. Insofar as the information they
can gather about borrowers is rather suspect, then banking relationships tend to be31
built on other more informal bases. With a lack of reliable credit histories or
indeed means of establishing an independently verifiable record of good
performance, banks have to operate on a more collateralised basis or with
guarantees from others with some sort of record. However, this same collateral
and the guarantees may be difficult to value. The proper valuation of a contingent
liability is only revealed if the contingency materialises. It is only then that the
bank discovers that the guarantee is not honoured or the collateral is not worth its
face value despite audit statements.
IAS was only introduced in the Baltic States in the mid-1990s and lack of
familiarity with its provisions and insufficient focus on the information
contributed to the banking crises (Fleming et al, 1997). Tax rules and the ability to
make loan loss provisions were only introduced after several years of transition.
4.4 A lack of tools – market discipline
It is clear from the foregoing that the transition and emerging economies may lack
not just the appropriate institutional structures to apply effective supervisory
regimes but that other tools are missing, particularly the minimum information
set. Both supervisors and bank management need the necessary skills and
experience but a system that relies heavily on enforcement by supervisors is
bound to face more difficulties, as they will always have an information
disadvantage. Market discipline plays a crucial role in supporting the efforts of
supervisors both to maintain prudent risk management in banks and to resolve
problems swiftly through the market mechanism (ie private sector solutions
including insolvency). In general it requires highly developed, deep and well-
informed markets to work well. This implies immediately that it is less likely to
be effective in transition and emerging economies. The question is whether that
limited operation will be sufficient. However, although the term market discipline
is widely used in the context of supervising and regulating banks it is largely
undefined. The new Basel proposals (Basel Committee, 2003) do not offer a
definition despite labelling the ‘third pillar’, ‘market discipline’.
While market discipline is a general concept, which can be applied to all
activity, there are many special features that affect its application in the field of
banking. First of all the authorities restrict its operation by controlling entry and
the range and nature of products. Borrowers have difficulty taking their business
elsewhere, particularly when their bank is in trouble, while depositors can usually
do so with all too much ease for the stability of the system. Discipline on banks
through the product market is therefore severely impaired in many countries and
this in itself should be a cause for concern to regulators in designing and
supervising the operation of the system.32
Attention in the banking industry therefore tends to focus on factor markets,
primarily on the provision of financial capital. However, particularly since
banking is a service industry, the labour market is an important ingredient in the
process. In investment banking, teams can be bid away from one bank to another
and the business will tend to move with them. The operation of the labour market
is particularly important for senior management. One of the key features
governing how problem banks behave relates to the expectations of senior
management over their future. In the market for corporate control, the senior
management may be part of what the acquirer wishes to purchase or they may be
precisely what the acquirer wishes to dispose of as being the main reason for poor
performance of the company compared to its potential.
The functioning of the market for corporate control is likely in many cases to
be the most important in handling a problem bank. The existing owners retain
control of the bank up to the point of insolvency or takeover by the authorities,
although their actions may be increasingly circumscribed as the problems worsen.
If a bank can be bought on the open market either directly or through an open bid
for the holding company then the discipline on the bank from the ‘market’ will be
much more effective. If the bank has a mutual structure, is largely private in
character or part of a large industrial group (or owned by central or local
government) then these pressures will operate very differently. It is clear therefore
that in the current context ‘market discipline’ will be very uneven. There may be
few alternative buyers and little pertinent information for such buyers as there are
to make informed decisions except at very substantial discounts – they may want
to be paid to take on the problem bank.
It is because of all the possible constraints on the other markets that there has
been a focus in the literature (see Evanoff and Wall, 2002, for a survey) on the
market for subordinated debt. If all banks had to hold a proportion of their capital
in the form of subordinated debt that was actively traded and needed to rolled over
frequently, then it might be possible to get a some fairly clear market signals that
would act as a disciplining device on the bank. This seems a rather unlikely
source of finance in most emerging markets but inter-bank finance will be normal.
Here, in a less developed market, different pressures may emerge. With relatively
few players it may well be possible for the other banks to gang up on a bank
thought to be in trouble and in effect refuse to lend to it, in the hope that they, as
the most likely purchasers, can extract a discount. This market closure then pushes
the authorities towards intervention.
In any case it is necessary to have more than a clear market signal for it to act
as a disciplining device (Bliss and Flannery, 2000). Bank managements or the33
other stakeholders, including the authorities, that are involved have to respond.
32
Thus the vital ingredients for market discipline are twofold: that there should be
an open active market with sufficient well-informed players that the resulting
‘price’ signal reflects a general view.
33 Second that the corporate governance of
the bank and the financial system should be such that this signal is translated into
action. Given the constraints we have mentioned affecting markets that impinge
on banks it is likely to be a combination of effects on all of the ‘stakeholders’ in
the bank that is required to offer effective market discipline. Lewellyn (2000)
suggests it is possible to identify at least seven necessary conditions for market
discipline to work effectively, which between them comprise a viable framework.
The disciplining role of the markets (including the inter-bank market) was
weak in the crisis countries of South East Asia in the 1990s. This was due
predominantly to the lack of disclosure and transparency of banks, and to the fact
that little reliance could be placed on the quality of accountancy data provided in
bank accounts. This is not an issue for less developed countries alone. For
instance, market discipline has not operated efficiently in Japan due largely to
insufficient financial infrastructure (weak accountancy rules, inadequate
disclosure etc). The lack of monitors in the form of rating agencies, market
analysts and even competitors will be a substantial limitation in many small and
emerging markets.
An exit regime merely provides an endpoint to the continuing sequence of
pressures that assist the maintenance of prudent banking behaviour. If there is
little pressure through the market then the main effort with have to come through
the supervisory authorities who are not best placed to exercise it. If exit is not
thought likely then banks may also refuse recapitalisation plans offered by the
authorities that involve stringent conditions (Corbett and Mitchell, 2001).
4.5 The role of interest groups and lack of transparency in
official actions
One of the most effective barriers comes not just from the rules or the institutional
framework itself but from the ability to delay. If action can be sufficiently delayed
then the ability to run a robust exit policy will be effectively removed. The
                                                
32 The relevant stakeholders include: supervisory agencies, rating agencies, market traders,
shareholders, debt-holders, depositors, managers, borrowers and employees. The list is not
necessarily complete. The group clearly includes borrowers as they may be heavily affected as a
bank gets into difficulty. Loans may be called in rather than rolled over and new business may
become difficult.
33 Regard also needs to be paid to ‘quantity’ signals. When senior staff leave or a bank withdraws
from the subordinated debt market this is just as clear a signal as the change in the price of its debt.34
incentives for delay are considerable in all circumstances but they may well be
particularly large in emerging and transition economies if the authorities are less
immune from political pressure and the banks wield greater influence, especially
if they can claim with some justification that their lending has been directed
towards riskier projects by the government.
34 The banks themselves will be keener
on delay if they can manage to abstract more value for the owners at the expense
of the creditors. Debtors may also be able to form a rather effective lobby group,
if they constitute strategic firms in the economy, whether from the point of view
of export earnings or employment. In so far as public ownership is more prevalent
then the government may face a conflict of interest over whether to keep its own
problems as unrecognised bad loans in the banks or as acknowledged liabilities to
depositors or new owners of the bank. The poorer the information available and
the less the transparency of the supervisory purpose, the easier it will be for the
supervisor to feel that decisions can be postponed. Supervisors will be particularly
keen to avoid precipitating closure if they think they rather than the bank’s
management may be blamed for the problem. The authorities also have a strong
incentive to let banks continue of they do not have the resources to meet the costs
of insolvency in terms of the demands on the deposit insurance fund.
Transparency is equally important for the supervisory authority. If the
supervisors know that their actions will be audited by parliament and hence
publicly they need to make sure that their procedures in respect of each bank are
followed through properly and that their actions fit with their objectives. This
form of liability for public servants is not common in many societies but helps
avoid the tendency to forbear and to hope that problems may go away (Tison,
2003). It also makes for consistency of treatment across banks. Applying it in a
relatively small agency such as banking supervision where staff need to be well
qualified may increase the chance of successful introduction and avoiding
generating labour disputes in a way that may not be true of the public sector at
large. The Finnish supervisory agency even includes transparency for its
management methods. If subject banks need to monitor their risks effectively, the
supervisory authority setting a good example in its own management methods
should be a help.
There are some clear problems here. Ingves (2003), for example, argues for
‘clear [legal] protection for supervisors’ (p. 7) so they can withstand pressures
from the interested parties. However, such protection has to be carefully phrased
if it is not also to allow them to make arbitrary decisions in favour of particular
groups. The opening up of public authorities and officials to the consequences of
their actions if not performed within the terms of the regulations or indeed from
applying regulations that do not meet adequate standards is a reasonably new
                                                
34 Raina (2002) cites the case of directed lending by the state banks in Turkey in their banking
crisis.35
concept. Having an ombudsman who can exercise separate impartial review is not
universally accepted. In many societies the opportunity for officials to fully a
predetermined line and avoid political pressure at the time of a crisis is small.
Recourse to courts even if available in theory may not be a practical possibility.
Problems with public transparency apply right across government. Boorman
and Hume (2003) suggest that a lack of transparency in Indonesia about the crisis
in 1997 and about the government’s actions to counter it, helps explain why
Indonesia took so much longer to control its problems than did South Korea or
Thailand, for example. Similarly, in the case of Malaysia, the lack of
independence of the supervisors means that decisions are effectively taken by the
government (Das et al, 2002).
5 Concluding remarks
Taken together the list of six drawbacks discussed in Section 4 suggests that
emerging and transition economies will tend to have more problems in handling
problem and insolvent banks that their more advanced market counterparts. This
will inevitably put more pressure on the authorities to intervene and will tend to
result in the distribution of the losses entailed across the economy in ways many
would find both arbitrary and inequitable. This increases rather than diminishes
the advantages from having a simple and robust scheme of bank exit that not just
pushes the authorities into early action before the problems become unmanageable
and turn into a crisis but also pushes the banks themselves towards wishing to
keep out of the problem territory and to find private sector solutions.
That said, the authorities in emerging and transition economies are likely to
find themselves increasingly in the hands of the advanced country authorities, as
foreign ownership of banks becomes more pervasive. While this is likely to help
in the maintenance of prudent practices it may pose additional difficulties as
banking problems emerge. The home authorities may be prepared to take
decisions that have a harsh impact on small host markets, where the banks may be
more systemically important, yet those authorities may have little requirement or
willingness to contribute to the costs this imposes. As the European transition
economies join the EU they may be able to negotiate a way out of this through
local agreements or regional co-operation but generalised international agreement,
even at the EEA/EU level, seems a rather distant prospect at present.
The institutional arrangements made to cover problem banks interact,
particularly the protection of depositors and robust exit policy. If the deposit
insurance company does not have a strong incentive to ensure that banks are well
supervised in order to protect its funds, then a robust exit policy may be relatively
ineffective in encouraging prudence by banks and may still shift the risks onto the36
taxpayer in an inequitable manner. If the fund is inadequately capitalised this will
still push the cost onto the smaller and less informed depositors (households) and
can lead to wider economic consequences in the form of an economic downturn or
a spreading financial crisis. In many transition and emerging market economies
the incentives in the deposit insurance scheme are inadequate (Beck, 2003). A
wider range of changes than just bank exit law is required if the allocation of
losses in the occurrence and avoidance of bank insolvency is not to be inequitable
for the groups in society less able to protect themselves.37
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Appendix 1
The MHL (2001) scheme
35
Step 1: The authorities are required to take over control of the bank according to
prescribed benchmarks.
The fundamental requirement for being able to move rapidly in the case of
difficulty is that the authorities have the power to intervene, assume control of the
problem bank without having to consult the existing shareholders (whose shares
are in any case valueless in the case of insolvency) and apply a sufficient haircut
to the claims of the creditors that the insolvency is ended (assets are no longer less
than liabilities). This means in practice that bank insolvency has to be dealt with
by a lex specialis under public law rather than by a lex generalis under private
(company) law, as the latter does not normally offer the opportunity for such swift
intervention. The United States is probably the best example of this lex specialis
regime. But the MHL scheme differs in one crucial respect from the US
counterpart, namely, that the scheme is not necessarily implemented on behalf of
the deposit insurance fund. In some countries deposit insurance schemes do not
exist, while in others they are funded by the state or co-funded.
36
Like the US arrangements, the MHL scheme requires the authorities to act at
certain points and is structured to restrict the opportunity for forbearance.
Ambiguity is not constructive if banks interpret it to mean that there will probably
be forbearance and ultimately a bail out. The scope for official discretion is
limited in the scheme not just by prescribed published rules for prompt action
37
but by requirements for transparency/disclosure on the part both of banks and of
                                                
35 This section is drawn from pp. 33–39 of Mayes and Liuksila (2003).
36 One point we return to later is that the US scheme has an important logic to it that is missing
from many other deposit insurance schemes. Namely, in the US the FDIC not only succeeds to the
claims of the insured depositors under insolvency but it then has effective priority in the resolution
of the problem owing to the size of its claim and can direct the solution towards the interests of the
fund. In other countries, including Finland, the deposit insurer becomes liable to pay out
depositors to the full extent of their insurance but has to take its place with the other claimants in a
court directed insolvency process. Insofar as such funds are inadequate or state provided there will
be an extra exposure of the taxpayer to losses, at least temporarily, compared to the US system.
Under MHL the loss to be minimised by the authorities in resolving the problem is the loss to
society as a whole insofar as it has not taken on a specific risk through deliberate exposure to the
bank in trouble, largely in the sense of the taxpayer.
37 The MHL scheme is complementary to the normal proposals for Prompt Corrective Action
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2002), for example) but it will normally shorten the
process of seeking solutions to an undercapitalised bank’s problems by commencing the ‘exit’
procedure earlier.45
the supervisory authorities. Thus not only will it be impossible to keep the
existence and extent of a bank’s problems confidential for long but the authorities
will be publicly accountable for their actions after the event. In any case
information tends to leak out and the well-informed professional investors have an
advantage.
38
Defining the prescribed intervention point is a problem. If the bank were
thought to be technically solvent under normal private law definitions then closure
could be thought to deprive the shareholders, managers and indeed possibly some
of the employees of rights. However, enforced bank closure of solvent banks is
already possible under certain circumstances (in addition to cases of criminal
behaviour or failure of a ‘fit and proper persons’ test). For example, it is normal to
insist on the meeting of at least the Basel criteria for permission to operate as a
bank. Rescinding a banking licence in the event of undue delay in recapitalisation
is a normal feature of most prompt corrective action regimes.
39 If such a bank is
not insolvent then it should be possible to achieve an orderly winding up where
depositors do not lose access to their funds and there is no systemic fall out from
the closure. Unfortunately, however, the capital adequacy ratios as computed
under the Basel criteria do not equate with measures of solvency. The Basel
criteria relate to risk-weighted capital on a book-value basis not to the concept of
economic capital relevant to measuring insolvency. Capital as measured under the
Basel criteria can be clearly positive when net worth is negative and the changes
proposed under Basel2 will not alter this. The US regulations address this by
requiring that a bank must be closed if its capital ratio falls below 2 percent.
40 The
chances are that such a bank is already insolvent in the sense that sale of its assets
will not meet the total of the claims.
41 The Tier One capital of a bank does not
represent an unencumbered pile of cash that can be used to pay out depositors and
creditors but an obligation that ceases on the insolvency of the bank, in the case of
shareholder capital. Tier 2 capital is simply junior debt.
42 In any case the size of
                                                
38 In a careful survey of experience since FDICIA, Eisenbeis and Wall (2002, p. 39) note that even
in the US there has been a drift away from trying to minimise the insurance losses: ‘Recent
supervisory efforts appear to be directed towards the long-standing goal of minimizing the
probability of bank failure’. They see Basel2 in particular as a move away from trying to minimise
the social costs of bank failure and eliminate moral hazard.
39 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2002) provides a comprehensive exposition of the
recommended types of prompt corrective action.
40 Tangible equity capital to total assets ratio.
41 Berger et al (1991) provide an early exposition of the accounting valuation problems involved.
42 While meeting the Basel requirements probably involves simultaneous solvency in the MHL
sense, the authorities would be well advised to switch to focusing on solvency if the minimum
Basel conditions are breached, in deciding upon the appropriate course of action. Market views of
the riskiness of the bank, as expressed in the spreads on subordinated debt, will also provide useful
information to the supervisor on the need for action.46
these measures of ‘regulatory’ capital depends on the degree to which the bank
chooses to recognise the extent of its problems and the degree to which the
authorities impose that recognition (Evanoff and Wall, 2002).
43 Typically loan
portfolios tend to be overvalued in these circumstances. The Mexican government
was not unusual in buying non-performing loans at face value (De Luna-Martinez,
2000).
MHL suggested that an appropriate benchmark for intervention might be a
concept of ‘economic insolvency’ or zero net worth. At this point the current
value of the liabilities just exceeds the market value of the assets. The rationale is
simple: this is the point at which creditors and depositors could not expect to be
paid back sufficiently rapidly and hence the point at which a run on the bank
would be a sensible strategy. ‘Economic insolvency’ differs from legal insolvency
in that, in the legal insolvency case, the circumstances can only be determined
after the event when the assets are eventually sold and the expenses deducted,
which may take a period of many years. Net worth is normally on a ‘present
value’ basis. Legal insolvency is triggered either by failure to pay due liabilities or
the expectation of failure to pay in the view of the courts.
44
A different way of looking at economic insolvency would be the point at
which the central bank could no longer continue to lend against available
collateral, because that collateral was exhausted.
45 The two would not be the same
because the central bank is prepared to take a longer-term view of asset valuation
than the market. In any case the fact that the distressed bank had been unable to
find a market solution for its problems might imply that even taking the value of
‘goodwill’ into account it could not come up with a positive net value. The
concern was to try to find a benchmark where the information could be readily
                                                
43 As Evanoff and Wall (2002) point out the Basel2 proposals are largely aimed at improving the
measurement of the denominator of the capital adequacy ratio. Many problems remain with the
measurement of ‘capital’ in the numerator. Since recognising losses automatically reduces the
ratio and encourages supervisory intervention there is bound to be a tendency for the
acknowledged ratios to overstate the real position even if accounting is on an economic value
rather than an historic cost basis.
44 It is important to call a halt as early as possible in the process of declining net worth, as
otherwise a bank can continue to liquidate its unencumbered assets at a discount to pay out those
depositors and creditors who request it at the expense of the uninsured depositors or creditors who
are not aware of the problem. Non-financial companies cannot usually realise their assets in a
similar way as they are normally collateral for loans although there have been some notorious
examples of gaining access to the employee pension fund. If the problem can be caught early then
the loss and its systemic implications will be smaller and the chances of arranging a solution
without recourse to the taxpayer greater.
45 This is effectively the concept of ‘liquidity-based insolvency’ described by Ramsey and Head
(2000).47
available and where it would be difficult for shareholders or creditors to complain
that they were being worse treated than under insolvency.
46
Step 2: The administrator of the insolvent bank values the assets and liabilities
up front and writes down the claims so as to return to operational
solvency
47
The authorities need to make a rapid assessment of the value of assets and
liabilities in order to make an appropriate write down. This entails that normal
supervisory requirements will entail both bank structures and reporting are
sufficient to make this feasible. (In the same way, bank structures have to be such
as to make seizure feasible. A requirement, which is particularly difficult in the
case of complex multinational institutions, to which we return below.) Such an
assessment will no doubt be inaccurate. Hence, while creditors and shareholders
will not have the right to challenge the actions of the authorities in resolving the
bank, as delay could effectively kill the scheme, they would have the right to seek
compensation after the event, should the assessment be more unfavourable than
they would have received under insolvency.
In writing down the claims the administrator will need to respect the priority
of claims. One of the ‘neat’ features of the US system is that state moves into the
driving seat through the FDIC becoming decision-maker in succession to the
claims of the insured depositors. This is not a feature of some European systems,
where despite the liability for paying out on deposit insurance the state does not
get to control the decision over how to resolve the bank.
Having got the bank back from insolvency the authorities would have to find
a means of recapitalising the bank. In the interim, however, to give confidence to
depositors and all those involved in future transactions the authorities would no
doubt have to issue a guarantee against loss by the new, resolved institution.
48 A
variety of methods have been advanced for recapitalisation (and the initial write
down), including a suggestion by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand that the
creditors should in effect swap debt for equity and become the new owners of the
bank. The Aghion et al (1992) proposals are a related approach whereby each
group of creditors can effectively auction off their claims in increasing order of
priority. It is of course always open to the state to recapitalise the bank and then
                                                
46 An inherent part of any resolution process is that it should take due account of the ‘franchise’
value of the bank. This helps explain the keeness among regulators to keep the business of the
bank going and the relative rarity of solutions that do not at least involve separating the failed
institution into a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ bank.
47 We use the generic term ‘administrator’ to embrace the possible regimes of receivers,
conservators etc and cases where the authority involved may be an organisation or an individual.
48 This temporary organisation is usually labelled a bridge bank in the US.48
sell it at some later date. MHL do not make a choice between the methods, as the
particular choice is not crucial to the principle of the reorganisation scheme.
There are, however, some important issues about who should be responsible
that need to be resolved. The structure will depend very much on the nature of the
regulatory system, with roles for the central bank, as provider of liquidity to the
market or individual institutions in the traditional lender of last resort framework
(ie collateralised lending to institutions thought solvent in the sense of having
adequate collateral), the supervisors of the relevant financial sectors, the bank
licensing authority, the deposit insurance fund and the ministry of finance. MHL
largely describe this in the simplest framework, where the central bank is also
responsible for supervision and licensing. A key issue however is that to preserve
incentives it is important to separate the responsibility for instituting and
managing the insolvency resolution from the authority with access to public
funds. Even where it is the central bank, it is essential not mix the lender of last
resort function with responsibility for the closure of individual banks. It would be
easy to use lender of last resort as a means of advancing the public sector up the
priority of claimants on an insolvent institution.
Step  3: The bank reopens for business under new control/ownership with no
material break in operation
It is anticipated that such a reorganisation would normally take place over a
‘weekend’. More than a working day or so of closure would be likely to start
generating the systemic consequences that the scheme is intended to avoid. Unless
the government wishes to get into the business of banking, it would presumably
wish to return the bank to normal private sector ownership and recapitalisation as
soon as possible, whether by merger, acquisition, flotation or other means of
disposal. Where there are no systemic concerns then orderly closure still remains
possible and the choice of solution would presumably depend on the public cost.
It is of course always open to the authorities to decide that they wish to use
public funds to compensate the losers, fully or in part, presumably only if they
could show that the alternative involved a larger net present value of the loss to
the taxpayer.
49
                                                
49 MHL refer to the ‘taxpayer’ as the body with respect to whom the loss is minimised. This is a
representation of some form of social loss minimisation, ie that it is the cost to society as whole
that should be minimised in dealing with actual and potential bank failure.49
A1.1 Cross-border complications
The discussion thus far treats the problem of handling bank insolvency as if it
were an issue for a single jurisdiction. Indeed it does not even address the issue of
complex national financial firms in more than a few words. Both regards are
considered more important and more intractable by MHL than the foregoing. The
largest bank in Finland is spread over Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and
indeed the Baltic States (with branches in Poland and Russia). The second largest
bank is not only operating in more than one country but is also the second largest
insurance company. In general the EU is not well organised for handling problems
with cross-border institutions. Although the responsibility for consolidated
supervision and deposit insurance may be clear and Memoranda of Understanding
exist for the sharing of information among supervisors, it is not at all clear how
the failure of a major cross-border bank would be handled (Brouwer et al, 2003).
Whereas in the case of very large national institutions the expectation is
currently that they will be bailed out in the face of insolvency (ie that the
authorities will provide emergency funds to keep the business trading, even if in
the form of purchase and assumption), the position for cross-border banks is much
more difficult. The position is very clear for Switzerland, where both UBS and
Credit Suisse have the majority of their operations outside Switzerland. The new
Swiss legislation, which is very similar to the MHL proposals and is described by
Hüpkes (2003), explicitly places a ceiling of 4bnCHF on the payout for any one
institution. Otherwise the liabilities for deposit insurance funds and taxpayers in
small countries could become unsustainably large.
50 Such banks can be ‘Too Big
to Save’, for a small country (Sigurðsson, 2003). Since many of the losses will
accrue to people in other countries from operations in those countries it is not
likely that the authorities in the headquarters’ country will be willing to make too
extensive payments. In the case of the US it is possible to discriminate against
foreign depositors but not in the EEA, where equal treatment is required,
especially with respect to depositors in other EEA countries. In order to stop a
grab for local assets, the Winding-up directive requires the treatment of
insolvency on a group basis, although frequently administrators would want to sell
                                                
50 Many deposit insurance ‘funds’ are not really funded as such but as in the US can draw on
public funds. Premiums paid in advance are similar to hypothecated taxation. Similarly, increases
in premiums after depletion of the ‘fund’ are levied on surviving banks to replenish the notional
balance.50
off viable subsidiaries early on in a liquidation process in order to maximise the
realisable value of the assets (Moss et al, 2002).
51
MHL argue that the same process described at the national level should also
apply at the cross-border level in the EEA. This would require making one
authority responsible for decision-making regarding the international banking
group. While in the longer-term it may appear sensible to create a European level
organisation for the purpose, at present it would be necessary at least to have a
panel of acceptable people who can be called upon to act in the event of the
failure of a multinational bank. Such administrators might very well face
considerably greater problems over obtaining the information to value claims up
front. The national supervisors would have to be collating information on a
continuing basis to make this possible. Secondly they may well face a conflict of
interest. A bank with systemic implications for one country in which it operates
may not be regarded as systemic by the authorities in the headquarter (home)
country, where the decisions will be taken.
52 It is thus necessary to know in
advance what the attitude of the participants is.
In contrast with the national position it is not clear what the fall back will be
in the case of difficulty. One clear possibility is insolvency, if the home country
does not feel it has adequate resources for a rescue and other parties cannot be got
round the table in time. If this were the case then the incentives for prudent
management and early private sector resolution might be sharper than in the
national case and the moral hazard smaller. However, such a ‘disorderly’ outcome
for unfortunate practical reasons would not represent responsible regulation. Some
form of credible system needs to be in place by the time of the first crisis. The
inhibiting factor in achieving this is that it is a ‘small country’ problem in a forum
where decision-making is dominated by larger countries that do not necessarily
face such a pressing need.
All of the other issues raised for national banks are writ large for complex
cross-border institutions – clarity of corporate structure, availability of adequate
information produced according to coherent accounting standards and reputable
audit. Although the issues may have been adumbrated by Brouwer et al (2003) it
is by no means clear that they are well on the way to be addressed.
                                                
51 Other than the EU Winding-up directive for credit institutions (2001/24/EC) there are few rules
governing international insolvency, other than the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency of 1997 and the International Bar Association Concordat on Cross-Border Insolvency
of 1995 (see Contact Group (2002) for a discussion).
52 When the EEA expands in May 2004, with the addition of ten new members, the chance of a
bank being viewed as systemic in a second country but not in the headquarter country will rise
noticeably, given the degree of foreign ownership of banks in the accession countries.51
Appendix 2
The role of market discipline and corporate governance
53
Trying to ensure a strong measure of market discipline forms a major part of
supervisory regimes both in normal operation and in the resolution of problems.
The key feature of market discipline is that it should provide incentives to all of
the stakeholders in the bank, whether shareholders, managers, depositors,
creditors or supervisors, to see that the bank is prudently managed. This discipline
exists because the market players can act on the basis of the information that is
available on the bank, not just in absolute terms but relative to its competitors in
the sector.
While the recommendations in the Basel2 proposals for the amount of
information to be publicly disclosed by banks meets much of the arguments we
set out in MHL for efficient market discipline, its timeliness does not. If the
information available is six months or more out of date, the actual position of a
bank has been able to change markedly from that published. Market players will
then try to rely on more informal information, which may not only be less
accurate and comparable but will not be equally available to all the stakeholders.
The ability to put off knowledge of the true circumstances and the size of any
revelations that may then occur can on the one hand contribute to the instability of
the market and on the other make it more difficult for the process of trying to take
over the bank as a going concern to succeed.
Banks that are not performing as well as the rest of sector tend to be subject to
takeover bids. Such bids will occur when the bank is still readily meeting the
regulatory criteria. If the market can react to these more marginal signals then the
chance of getting into severe difficulty will be reduced. The problem comes for
banks whose governance structures do not permit the ready exercise of market
discipline. Obvious examples are where the bank is privately owned, say as part
of an industrial group, or its shares are not directly quoted, where it is state owned
or where it is a more mutual organisation, as in the case of a cooperative or
savings bank. In these circumstances, not only is it difficult for the signals to be
observed but there is much less pressure that those who are affected can place on
the back to see change. For this reason it is often suggested that all banks should
be forced to face significant exposure to the market, say, by being required to
have a significant amount of subordinated debt, which has to be rolled over in the
market in the short run, so it is actively priced (Calomiris, 1999). Even though this
finance may in some sense be superfluous it results in signals to which others,
including the authorities, react (Evanoff and Wall, 2002).
                                                
53 This Appendix is drawn from pp. 43–47 of Mayes and Liuksila (2003).52
On the whole the nature of the incentive structures from market discipline is
relatively clear. The employees of the bank clearly have something at stake, in
terms of income in the short run. It is however, more difficult to say whether the
failure of the bank they work for harms or advances their careers in the longer
term. When it comes to the managers or directors who can in some way be
thought responsible, then it may harm their career prospects and those who have
suffered losses as a result of those actions will no doubt think that only
appropriate. Once one is dealing with the higher echelons of management where
part of their remuneration is linked to the performance of the bank then the
potential losses from failure will be greater and hence the incentive to avoid it and
have a less ignominious exit also greater. Thus the incentive to avoid or take
excess risks will have an extra facet when problems occur, depending upon the
likely action of the authorities. If senior managers think the authorities may keep
the institution in being and allow them to retain their jobs if they respond in a risk-
averse manner (as was arguably the case for some US thrifts in the 1980s) then
they will do so. But if the only real hope of retaining their jobs is through taking a
large gamble then that too is likely to be the choice they will make.
54
The position for depositors is complicated when their deposits are insured. In
the first place, to the extent their deposits are insured, particularly if they can
access them rapidly after a failure, they will have little incentive to monitor the
bank. In any case it is normally thought that the general run of depositors are not
sufficiently well informed to either process or act on the information available.
Only the larger depositors are likely to be in that position. The deposit insurance
organisation therefore tends to act on behalf of the depositors it insures. While it
may rely on the supervisors to look after its interests when the bank is performing
normally it can have a much greater role in the event of difficulty, ending up as
the lead organisation in a reorganisation in the case of the US FDIC, for example.
However, having the authorities take the lead on behalf of depositors is not the
same as having them take account of both those who are directly exposed as
taxpayers and those who are indirectly exposed as the customers of other banks or
as taxpayers. It is therefore important to recognise that borrowers and their
customers, creditors etc. are also exposed. If a bank has to retrench it may not roll
over some loans and prefer to remain in liquid assets. Some of their clients may
themselves then go out of business or shrink if this experience is fairly widespread
in the banking sector. MHL therefore argue that it is this wider public interest that
should be taken into account in deciding how to act.
Market valuations of assets can be decidedly procyclical, as can assessments
of risk, particularly those like KMV that make use of equity prices. The market
can therefore be a very harsh judge of the value of a bank, as the valuation reflects
not just the underlying position of the bank under consideration but also the
                                                
54 I am grateful to Larry Wall for this point.53
position of the potential purchasers. This double valuation approach is the
appropriate way to value a problem bank from the point of view of the stability of
the system as a whole, as the problem does not disappear, but is merely acquired
by another bank in the system. The weakness applies to the system as a whole and
not just to the problem bank in these circumstances. However, this valuation
implies that the risks are borne by the shareholder side of the market. It is a
valuation based on the full extent of creditor claims. If the bank were declared
insolvent and the creditor claims written down then the valuation to an acquiring
bank would be different. Similarly the valuation would be different again if the
acquirer were only acquiring various of the assets and liabilities of the troubled
bank and not the business as such.
55 Acquiring access to the customer base is
likely to have a clear value and indeed it is normally argued that despite the ‘fire
sale’ element in market valuations, the valuation of the bank as a going concern
tends to exceed that under insolvency (Hoggarth et al, 2002, James, 1991).
Guttentag and Herring (1993) suggest that ‘banks usually are worth more alive
than dead even when their value alive is negative’. This in itself helps explain the
authorities’ enthusiasm for finding market solutions prior to failure.
The most important aspect in this regard in the event of insolvency is that the
time horizon of the parties involved differs. If the assets of the bank are to be sold
off under insolvency proceedings and maximum discounted value extracted from
the non-performing loans then a rather longer time horizon will be adopted than
would be the case in a more rapid sale with the aim of staying in business. This
dilemma is reflected in the accounting standards for valuation and in the internal
methods of valuation used by the bank. In general, US practice under GAAP tends
to result in a valuation closer to the immediate market prices than the IFAS
approach (although the two are coming close to a generalised agreement). This
poses both problems of international comparability and of rapid valuation in the
case of a resolution. Typically a regulator would not be able to get an immediate
valuation on the ideal basis for taking a decision about how to proceed. However,
it is arguable that this is precisely the information that the supervisors should
insist on obtaining, rather than simply regulatory capital measures, which will be
                                                
55 In effect therefore there are three valuation bases:
– valuing the entire bank (or its parts) as a going concern
– market valuation of the assets/liabilities of the bank – including off-balance sheet items
– valuation of the bank under insolvency,
none of which are totally transparent. Until a bid for part or a whole of the bank is completed, the
price can only be estimated not known. Marking some parts of the bank’s balance sheet to market
is very difficult, although the position has improved in recent years as markets have deepened and
valuation techniques improved and been standardised, and many off-balance sheet items such as
guarantees and contingent liabilities can be even harder. Similarly, valuation under insolvency is
only something which can be known at the end of the process and can only be estimated along the
way.54
increasingly less relevant as failure approaches. Problems are of course much
worse if accounting and auditing standards are not up to international best
practice. Halme in Halme et al (2000, p.  58) points out that ‘Skopbank was
apparently one of the most solvent banks in Finland at the start of the 1990s.
However the bank was taken over by the Finnish central bank in September
1991.’
56 The fact that the authorities can take a longer term view than markets for
the assets of a bank in difficulty means that there can be a role for a lender of last
resort. The major question then becomes how far down the list of collateral the
authorities are prepared to go, particularly when the discussion extends, say, to the
mortgage portfolio.
In so far as the authorities step in, even in the form of liquidity assistance,
problems can emerge from altering the ranking of creditors. The central bank for
example can indulge in collateralised lending earlier to reduce the chance of
uncollateralised or weakly collateralised lending later. Actions within what can be
described as the market framework can nevertheless have implications if
insolvency actually materialises.
57
As Edwards and Scott (1976) point out, the value of the capital buffer varies
very considerably depending on the routes used and available to an
undercapitalised bank in tackling its problems. If a bank can raise new capital,
albeit at relatively high cost, then it does not have to sell assets, merely write
down the value of impaired assets according to the prevailing rules. If a bank has
to realise assets in order to handle losses then it faces a much more difficult
downward spiral, as many such assets will have to be sold at a discount while
liabilities are met at par.
58
Effective pressure from markets thus depends crucially on two factors: the
ability to obtain meaningful values and prices; and on the ability and willingness
of the current and potential stakeholders in the banks to act on the basis of that
information.
                                                
56 She cites similar problems in the savings and loans crisis in the US where regulatory accounting
rules (RAP) were less strict than US GAAP.
57 In the US case the roles of the FDIC in triggering and managing insolvency and of the Federal
Reserve in exercising the Lender of Last Resort are clearly distinguished. Not only are there
limitations to the length of Federal Reserve lending according to the CAMELS rating (five days
for a critically undercapitalised bank) but the FDIC can claim restitution if the Federal Reserve’s
actions have materially increased the costs to the FDIC.
58 They argue that this discriminates against small banks as they will find it more difficult to raise
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